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ABSTRACT
MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) is one of the most promis-
ing logic style to counteract power analysis attacks. Unfor-
tunately, the static power consumption of MCML standard
cells is significantly higher compared to equivalent functions
implemented using static CMOS logic. As a result, the use
of such a logic style is very limited in portable devices. Para-
doxically, these devices are the most sensitive to physical
attacks, thus the ones which would benefit more from the
adoption of MCML.
We propose to overcome this limitation by reducing dras-
tically the static power consumption of MCML-based cryp-
tographic circuits. To this end, we designed Power Gated
MCML (PG-MCML), a standard cell library featuring a sleep
transistor in every cell. The effects of the sleep transistor
on performance as well as on area are negligible. Moreover,
the proposed differential library is supported by conventional
EDA tools.
We evaluated our standard cell library using Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) as benchmark and we compared
the power consumption, the area, and the DPA-resistance fig-
ures with the ones of static CMOS and conventional MCML.
Our results show that our PG-MCML library can achieve a
power consumption comparable with the one of static CMOS,
thus proving that PG-MCML cells can suit the strict power
budget of battery operated devices.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
B.7.1 [Integrated Circuits]: Types and Design Styles —
Algorithms implemented in hardware, Standard cells.
General Terms
Security, Design.
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Security, DPA, Current Mode Logic, Side Channel Attacks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The static CMOS design style is adopted in almost all
digital applications. Such a wide spread diffusion is mainly
due to its robustness and the negligible static power con-
sumption (as long as the leakage dissipation is not dominant).
Nevertheless, there are specific requirements which cannot
be fulfilled by static CMOS.
The most relevant application for which CMOS does not
represent the best solution is embedded system security. In
fact, devices such as smart cards or wearable systems are
characterized by a limited power budget, but they also need to
be robust against power analysis attacks. Such attacks, first
demonstrated in 1999 [8], exploit the correlation between the
power consumed by the device and the data being processed
to recover the secret key.
It is widely accepted that robustness against side channel
attacks can not be achieved using static CMOS: its data-
dependent power consumption is the key enabler for the
attack. On the contrary, MCML would be an appealing
candidate, since its power consumption is almost independent
from the specific input patterns or fan-out conditions. Yet,
the area overhead, the lack of tool support, and the large
static power consumption, have limited the diffusion of such
design option. Recently, the CAD tool problem was mitigated
by the work of Badel et al. [2], which proposes a standard
cell MCML library and discusses the problem of integrating
such library into place and route tools. Yet, to date, the high
power consumption was not addressed.
In this paper we solve this problem by applying a power
gating technique to MCML standard cells. The current-
based operation of the MCML logic style allows us to add
power gating to each cell with a negligible cost. We thus
implement a fine grain power gating technique suitable for
MCML cells and we built a MCML standard cell library to
support it. Our approach leads to a drastic reduction of the
power consumed by MCML, paving the way to a widespread
use of MCML as protected logic style in embedded systems.
To the best of our knowledge, this work represents the first
successful attempt to realize a library robust against power
analysis attacks which meets the low power constraints of
small and medium size modern embedded systems.
2. RELATEDWORK
MCML has been introduced by Yamashina et al. in
1992 [17] as a new logic style targeting, at least initially, high-
speed and mixed signal applications. To this end, MCML
offers reduced voltage swing and differential operation, two
key elements needed to reduce the generation of switching
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noise. In addition, power consumption is independent of the
operating frequency.
Due to these advantageous characteristics, MCML circuits
have been implemented in various demanding applications
such as high-speed ring oscillators, frequency dividers, and
multi-channel data multiplexing [13, 4, 5, 7]. Since the
power consumption depends less strongly on the particular
switching activity or the operating frequency, when used in
multi-GHz applications, MCML circuits typically consume
less power than conventional design styles.
Recently, with the advent of power analysis attacks [8] and
the differential power analysis (DPA) in particular, another
application for MCML has appeared. DPA-resistant logic
gates, in fact, should not exhibit a significant input pattern-
dependence with respect to current drawn from the power
supply [16]. Indeed, MCML outperforms other DPA-resistant
logic styles [15, 11] considering the current fluctuations pro-
duced during switching events. On the negative side, the
power consumed when the device is not switching limits
MCML utilization in medium or low frequency applications.
One of the first attempts of reducing the power consumed
by current mode logic styles was presented by Allam et al. [1].
In their work, the authors proposed Dynamic Current Mode
Logic (DyCML), which combines the advantages of conven-
tional MCML with the ones of dynamic logic. Unlike CML
circuits, DyCML gates employ a dynamic current pulse. As
a consequence, the power dissipation is only due to the gates
which are processing data. However, the complexity associ-
ated with the dynamic current source generation limits the
applications of DyCML in advanced nodes. Moreover, it is
not possible to use conventional EDA tools to design circuits
based on DyCML. Thus, the use of DyCML is considered
unpractical.
More recently, Badel et al. [2] proposed a standard cell de-
sign methodology suitable for differential circuit style. Their
work reports a successful design of a MCML based standard
cell library supported by conventional EDA tools. However,
the library used by Badel et al. was not designed targeting
embedded applications.
To minimize the area and the cost overhead due to MCML
gates, researchers considered to use them only for critical
cryptographic operations and to realize the rest of the design
with static CMOS libraries [12]. This approach mitigates the
area overhead of secured cryptographic circuits. However,
a large scale utilization of conventional MCML was never
considered since the power consumption is usually prohibitive
for embedded applications.
To this end, the power gated MCML library presented in
this paper is the first attempt toward widespread diffusion
of this technology in secure embedded systems. In fact, the
proposed sleep transistor insertion is much simpler compared
to the one of DyCML and it is easier to be implemented.
Moreover, our library is fully supported by commodity EDA
tools.
3. MCML OPERATING PRINCIPLE
MCML is a fully differential logic style with reduced voltage
swing. Every MCML gate consists of three main blocks,
namely the current source, the NMOS network and the load
resistors. The current source provides a constant bias current
ISS . The NMOS network realizes the Boolean function and
steers the current to one of the output load resistors resulting
in a voltage drop at one of the output terminal. The other
output will be at the same potential of the supply voltage
Vdd since no current is flowing through the resistor. The
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Figure 1: MCML operating principle (left) and
schematic of a buffer/inverter (right).
resulting voltage swing is defined as the difference between
the output levels and it is given by Eq. 1.
VSW = VDD − ISS ·R (1)
The current source is implemented using a NMOS transis-
tor operated in the saturation region. The logic function is
realized by a NMOS network that implements the correspond-
ing binary decision diagram (BDD). The load resistors can
be implemented either as passive or active devices. Passive
resistors occupy large silicon area and are highly sensitive
to process variations. There is typically a tolerance of 20
to 30% of the nominal value. Active load devices can be
implemented with PMOS devices which are biased in linear
region to produce a tunable load resistance.
Fig. 1 shows the basic principle of a MCML cell and
the transistor arrangement of a MCML buffer/inverter. As
the logic is fully differential, the inverted logic function is
obtained by exchanging the positive and the negative output
nodes. Depending on the complexity of the logic function,
several levels of stacked differential pairs may be needed.
The bias voltage Vp defines the resistivity of the active load,
while Vn determines the tail current. Vp, Vn, and sizing are
the design parameters which determine the performances of
MCML circuits. Power dissipation is a function of Vn and it
is defined by Vdd × Iss.
4. PG-MCML CELLS DESIGN
Power gating [6] is a technique which reduces the static
power consumption of a digital circuit by inserting power
switches (sometimes referred as sleep transistors) in the
supply path. To implement this technique, two solutions
have been proposed in the past: coarse-grain power gating,
in which complete blocks are disconnected from the power
supply and the ground through a common power switch, and
fine-grain power gating, in which every standard cell contains
a sleep transistor internally.
In conventional static CMOS circuits, the use of fine grain
power gating causes a significant area overhead and negatively
affects performance. For this reason, coarse grain power
gating is the preferred approach for static CMOS.
On the contrary, the insertion of a sleep transistor in each
MCML cell introduces negligible power overhead. Also, the
switching speed is not directly affected by the sleep transistor
since it is located outside the signal path. Therefore, in our
library, we implemented fine grain power gating, which suits
better the needs of MCML cells.
Moreover, a fine grain power gating allows to selectively
switch off each standard cells depending on the circuit topol-
ogy: this step can be easily automated during the synthesis
process, using an approach similar to automatic clock gating.
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Table 1: Area comparison between conventional
MCML and PG-MCML standard cells in 90 nm
CMOS technology.
Cell MCML [µm2] PG-MCML [µm2]
BUFX1 7.056 7.448
MUX4X1 19.7568 20.8544
AND4X1 16.9344 17.8752
DLX1 8.4672 8.9376
However, it should be taken into account that many of the
existing synthesis tools currently do not offer the capabilities
of fine grain power gating. This issue will be detailed in
Section 5.
Different power gating topologies for MCML standard
cells are depicted in Fig. 2. The solutions (a) and (b) use a
transistor to pull down the bias voltage Vn to ground during
the sleep mode. Solution (c) applies just a ON signal to the
gate of the current source and connects the bulk voltage to
the bias voltage Vn. Option (d) consists of an additional
sleep transistor in series with the current source.
Indeed, solution (a) was discarded since it requires the use
of a large bandwidth source follower amplifier to settle the
output voltage to Vn within a single clock cycle.
Option (b) slightly improves option (a). However, this
solution was discarded too, since it requires the insertion
of two transistors per cell. Solution (c) relies on the body-
biasing principle and modulates the bias current adjusting the
threshold voltage. However, to ensure a correct functionality
in all the process corners, the voltage Vn needs to range from
-500mV to 1V. Such voltage is difficult to obtain in practice.
In addition, the current source is sitting in a separate well.
This solution leads to a significant area overhead. For all the
above reasons, we selected solution (d). It can be seen from
the Fig. 2 that the sleep transistor is located on top of the
current source. Thanks to this choice, the sleep transistor
has a negative VGS voltage during power down, decreasing
the leakage current.
Table 1 shows the silicon area of MCML gates with and
without sleep transistor. On average, the cells with sleep
transistor are approximately 6% larger than conventional
MCML gates.
5. LIBRARY AND DESIGN FLOW
The PG-MCML library proposed in this work is based on
the standard cell design methodology proposed by Badel et
al. [2]. To demonstrate the benefit of power gating on a real
circuit we designed a relatively small library, including 16
cells. Nevertheless, it is worth to mention that an increased
number of cells would positively affects our results because
of the higher flexibility offered during synthesis, placement
and routing. The internally developed PG-MCML library is
specifically optimized for area and power, and the switching
speed of the PG-MCML cells is similar to the one of their
CMOS counterparts implemented on the same technology. As
previously mentioned, the main target application is security,
with particular emphasis on battery operated embedded
systems which need to be robust against power analysis
attacks.
The main difference between a MCML standard cell which
includes a sleep transistor and its conventional counterpart
is that, in the former, the minimal supply voltage and the
current source are slightly increased. Finally, to minimize
the layout area, we designed the sleep transistor and the
Table 2: Area and delay characteristic of the PG-
MCML library.
Cell Area [µm2] Delay [ps] MCML area/
CMOS area
Buffer 7.448 23.97 2.4
Diff2Single 8.9376 80.41
AND2 8.9376 41.34 1.9
AND3 13.40641 68.74 2.1
AND4 17.8752 99.96 2.8
MUX2 8.9376 43.58 1.2
MUX4 20.8544 87.11 1.2
MAJ32 17.8752 82.32
XOR2 8.9376 44.26 1.1
XOR3 17.8752 84.37 1.1
XOR4 20.8544 109.68 1.1
D-Latch 8.9376 36.32 1.3
DFF 17.8752 53.4 1.3
DFFR 26.8128 69.33 1.8
EDFF 23.8336 63.53
FA 35.7504 84.49 1.4
current source with the same channel width to share the
same diffusion region.
The PG-MCML library is designed using a 90 nm CMOS
process. To improve timing, area, and power we implemented
each cell using a combination of low-Vt and high-Vt transis-
tors. Indeed, high-Vt devices can reduce the leakage current
during sleep mode without affecting the cell delay, thus we
selected them for the NMOS Boolean network, the current
source and the sleep transistor. We used low-Vt devices for
the PMOS load, since this approach leads to the smallest
silicon area. Furthermore, smaller active loads have less par-
asitic and thus they lead to higher speed. To determine the
optimal bias current Iss, we explored how the cell delay and
the power consumption vary in function of the tail current.
Fig. 3 (a) depicts the delay for a MCML buffer/inverter driv-
ing FO1 and FO4 loads. Interestingly, increasing the bias
current above 250µA provides a limited speed improvement
with a large penalty in cell area. Fig. 3 (b) depicts the power
delay product under different bias conditions. The simulation
based evaluation revealed a minimum area delay product at
50µA.
Table 2 shows area and delay for the cells belonging to the
PG-MCML library. An area comparison between equivalent
cells in a commercial 90 nm standard cell library is also
provided. PG-MCML cells are 1.6 times larger in average. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the smallest area overhead
measured for a power analysis resistant library so far. Fig. 4
depicts the schematic and the layout view of a buffer cell
belonging to the PG-MCML library. Both driving strengths
one and four are shown.
Our cells are designed to support fine grain power gating.
Theoretically, in a design, there are several power gating
opportunities which could be detected automatically and
exploited during synthesis. However, since modern synthe-
sis tools are specifically designed for conventional CMOS
libraries, they do not support fine grain power gating. Due
to this limitation, we were forced to manually connect the
sleep transistor. For fine-grained power gating applications,
each individual sleep input of all cells in a cluster can be
driven collectively, provided that the signal is sufficiently
buffered.
The design flow used for PG-MCML is based on commod-
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Figure 2: Different power gating techniques for MCML circuits.
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Figure 3: Delay and Area delay trade-off for a MCML inverter driving FO1 and FO4 loads .
Figure 4: Schematic and layout views of a PG-
MCML buffer with drive strength X1 and X4. The
bias transistor is laid out close to the ground rail
while PMOS load transistors are placed below the
power rail. The sleep transistor is located next to
the bias transistor for minimal silicon area. Intra-
cell routing is limited to Metal-1 to facilitate inter
cell routing using upper metal layers.
ity EDA tools for synthesis, placement and routing. We
used Synopsys Design Compiler for synthesis and Cadence
Encounter Digital Implementation for placement and routing.
The last step exploits the fat-wire approach [2], which ensures
that both wires of a differential signal are routed side by side
(to have the same delay and load). In order to switch off
and on the controlled logic in a fraction of the clock cycle (in
the order of few ns), the sleep signal, managing the power
gating, should be buffered.
In practice, to control skew and propagation delay from
the root to the individual sleep input of all cells in a cluster,
the sleep signal is routed and buffered as a balanced tree.
Also, single ended clock buffers are used to route it with
a controllable insertion delay. To integrate such cells with
the PG-MCML library, we designed and characterized static
CMOS buffer/inverters with the same height as the PG-
MCML cells. The clock tree synthesis (CTS) engine available
in the place and route tool is used to synthesize the buffer
tree and route the sleep signal. In this way, we could exploit
capabilities already existing in digital design tools.
6. DPA RESISTANT PROCESSOR
As previously discussed, the main target applications of the
proposed PG-MCML library are embedded systems which
have to be robust against power analysis attacks. For these
devices, the most critical aspect is security. However, since
they are very often battery operated, minimizing the power
cost of the security features is an important goal.
Interestingly, very often, cryptographic functions included
in embedded devices are inactive over a long period of time,
thus our PG-MCML library is suitable for implementing these
blocks. An appealing target for PG-MCML is represented by
the DPA-resistant instruction set extension (ISE) recently
proposed in literature [14, 12]. In these works, the authors
proposed to augment a processor, realized with conventional
standard cell libraries, with additional functional units (in
the form of custom instructions) implemented in a logic
style robust against power analysis attacks. Considering the
relevance of such an example, we used the same approach to
evaluate the power consumption of PG-MCML.
We started from a software implementation of the AES al-
gorithm [10] and we augmented the OpenRISC 1000 [9] 32-bit
embedded processor with a custom functional unit, sitting in
the processor’s pipeline, consisting of four identical S-boxes
(each S-box is implemented in the form of 8 × 8 look-up-
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table) to match the processor’s word size. The new custom
instruction is labeled S-box ISE. Both the processor and
the custom instruction are available as RTL code. We syn-
thesized, placed and routed three different versions of the
considered core. In all cases, the processor was realized using
the reference static CMOS technology, a 90 nm commercial
standard cell library, while the protected instruction was
implemented using the same conventional CMOS technology,
the conventional MCML and the PG-MCML respectively.
The custom functional unit implemented with differential
cells was connected to the processor by means of convert-
ers and it appears in the processor’s layout as a macro
block. The full design was synthesized, placed and routed
setting 400MHz as operating frequency (to meet the speed
requirement of modern embedded systems) and a software
implementing the AES cipher was repeatedly executed 5000
times using a random plain-text. The full AES algorithm
was simulated with a logic simulator (Mentor Graphics Mod-
elsim) using the post place and route netlist and the delay
back annotation (in SDF format) as input.
For such a benchmark, the S-box ISE under evaluation
was active 0.01% of the whole execution time. The signal
triggering the custom instruction’s execution controls also
the sleep signal, so that the protected logic is turned on
only during the custom instruction execution. The sleep
signal is shared among all the cells that compose the custom
instruction and its insertion delay is approximately 1 ns.
This allows us to turn on the custom instruction in a small
fraction of the clock period and to process the data within
the same cycle. The circuit’s functionality has been verified
in simulation.
Vdd sleep
Vdd no sleep
14.421  ns
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Figure 5: Current waveform for S-box ISE with and
without power gating implemented. The sleep signal
waveform for the power gated implementation is also
plotted.
The custom instruction’s inputs, stored in VCD format, are
then used to run transistor level simulations (using Synopsys
Nanosim as fast SPICE simulator) to monitor the custom
instruction’s current consumption. Fig. 5 depicts the current
waveform of the S-box ISE realized with conventional MCML
(dashed line) and the one realized with our PG-MCML (solid
line). The clock and sleep signals are also depicted. It
can be seen how our power gating allows to significantly
decrease the power consumption: the current drawn by the
conventional MCML circuit is always flat (around 30mA),
CMOS MCML PG-MCML
Cells 3865 2911 3076
Area [µm2] 30’547.52 77’378.97 78’355.21
Delay [ns] 0.630 0.698 0.717
Avg Power [W] 207.72u 490.56m 47.77u
Table 3: Area, delay, and power consumption on the
S-box ISE implemented in different logic styles.
while the current absorption of the power gated S-box ISE
is almost negligible when encryption is not performed (sleep
signal low).
The overall results are summarized in Table 3, which re-
ports the area, the gate occupation, the delay, and the power
consumption for the considered S-box instruction set exten-
sion implemented in three different logic styles. The average
power consumption of PG-MCML is significantly lower com-
pared to the one of conventional MCML (reduced by a factor
or 104). Also, it can be noticed that PG-MCML consumes
four times less power than CMOS. This data should not
suggest that PG-MCML is less power hungry than static
CMOS logic, since when power gating techniques are ap-
plied to CMOS, the power consumption of this technology is
significantly reduced. Finally, it can be seen that the area
overhead necessary to support the sleep signal is negligible
(the PG-MCML is roughly 1000µm2 larger compared to
conventional MCML).
Considering the specific application field, we also carefully
evaluated the robustness against power analysis attacks of the
PG-MCML library. To evaluate the security, we synthesized,
placed and routed the commonly accepted reduced version
of the AES algorithm composed by a key addition and a
S-box look-up-table. Each implementation was realized using
three different technologies: the reference static CMOS, the
conventional MCML, and the PG-MCML. For all of them,
we performed SPICE simulation to extract the instantaneous
current of all possible plain-text secret key pairs, using very
high resolution both for current (1µA) and time (1 ps). Fi-
nally, we repeatedly attacked all the implementation using
as power model the Hamming weight of the S-box output [3].
As expected, all the attacks on the CMOS implementa-
tions were successful, while none of the ones performed on
conventional MCML as well as on PG-MCML were able to
reveal the secret key. In fact, as it can be seen from Fig. 6,
which reports an example of correlation power attack (CPA)
on PG-MCML, the secret key, plotted in black, is not dis-
tinguishable from all the other key guesses plotted in light
gray. Our experiments showed that the security level achiev-
able using the proposed PG-MCML is comparable to the
conventional MCML, thus the insertion of the sleep signal
does not introduce a negative effect on robustness against
power analysis attacks.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a fine grain power gating
technique for MCML circuits. A standard cell library imple-
menting the proposed strategy has been designed in 90 nm
CMOS technology. The library can synthesize, place and
route any circuit starting from its RTL description; therefore,
it can be directly used by designers with a limited additional
effort.
We have demonstrated that our power gating approach
dramatically reduces DC power consumption typical of con-
ventional MCML cells while maintaining the same level of
5
1018
53.6
Figure 6: Correlation power attacks to PG-MCML:
the black line, corresponding to the secret key, is
not distinguishable.
security. Moreover, the insertion of the sleep transistor does
not reduce the performances of the conventional MCML cells
and we proved that the proposed library is a promising tech-
nology for implementing DPA resistant embedded systems.
Automatic insertion of sleep signal during synthesis will be
investigated in future work.
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